Abstract Side-channel attacks on hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms have recently been the focus of much attention in the research community. Differential power analysis (DPA) has been shown to be particularly effective at retrieving secret information stored within an implementation. The design of DPA-resistant systems that are efficient in terms of speed and area poses a significant challenge. All-or-Nothing Transforms are cryptographic transforms, which are currently employed in numerous applications. We examine All-or-Nothing Encryption systems from the DPA perspective. This paper shows that All-or-Nothing cryptosystems, whilst not preventing sidechannel leakage, do fundamentally inhibit DPA attacks. Furthermore, we develop extensions to the All-or-Nothing protocol to strengthen the DPA resistance of the cryptosystem,
Introduction
Electronic devices naturally leak information about the data they are processing. For example, such leakage can manifest itself in the execution time of a cryptographic algorithm on the device [25] , via its power consumption [26] , or through electromagnetic emanations from the device [16, 38] . Side-channel attacks encompass the class of implementation attacks, which passively monitor these unavoidable physical manifestations, and then manipulate them to compromise the system's integrity. This field has been a popular research topic since its introduction to the cryptographic community in 1996 [25] . Inevitably, along with the development of an array of powerful attacks, there has also been active research to find appropriate, effective, and efficient countermeasures [7, 17, 20, 28, 37, 40, 41, 43] .
All-or-Nothing Transforms (AONTs) are unkeyed probabilistic transforms, with numerous applications in cryptography, that were originally proposed by Rivest [39] , as a means of complicating brute force key searches on block ciphers with short key lengths. Essentially, All-or-Nothing Encryption (AONE) consists of two stages. By applying an AONT to a plaintext message, a 'pseudo-message' is formed. The transform is highly diffusive, such that retrieval of the plaintext depends on all the bits of the pseudo-message. This preprocessing stage is not considered encryption, however, as the AONT does not use a secret key. An All-or-Nothing Encryption mode is formed when the pseudo-message is encrypted using a symmetric or asymmetric cipher.
In this paper, we consider All-or-Nothing cryptosystems from the point of view of side-channel attacks. We demonstrate how AONE systems are inherently resistant to DPA attacks. In addition, we demonstrate how the normal AONE mode can be extended, to further strengthen such encryption systems against DPA. We use hardware implementations as a running example, but our arguments should apply to embedded software implementations with straightforward modifications.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 provide the necessary background on DPA and AONTs, respectively. We concentrate on the properties of AONTs which make them interesting in the context of DPA in Sect. 4 . In Sect. 5, we propose an extension to the existing AONE protocol, aimed at completing the DPA resistance of AONE systems. Finally, we examine example constructions of the new protocol in Sect. 6 and conclude in Sect. 7.
Differential power analysis
In this section, we define the adversary that one has to consider when implementing a cryptographic algorithm on a device that can, potentially, be attacked by DPA. Typically, we consider an attacker, who has a device where a cryptographic algorithm can be executed, and can collect some side-channel information for each execution. The first such attack in the literature was described by Kocher [25] , who observed that the time required to execute an algorithm can potentially reveal information on cryptographic keys. The countermeasures to such attacks are trivial, and we typically consider more sophisticated attacks.
In this paper, we consider an attacker who is able to acquire the power consumption [26] or measure the electromagnetic emanations around a device [16, 38] . Such attacks are typically referred to as differential power analysis (DPA) and differential electromagnetic analysis (DEMA), respectively. Both of these attacks follow the same steps to derive information on cryptographic keys. For simplicity, we refer only to DPA attacks in this paper. However, it should be noted that the new DPA countermeasures described in this article can also be used to thwart attacks based on electromagnetic emanations.
An implementation is therefore considered as a black box where an adversary can inject chosen messages and retrieve the produced ciphertext whilst making appropriate side-channel measurements. That is, an attacker can conduct attacks in the chosen plaintext or known ciphertext model and has no access to any intermediate states in a given algorithm. Below, we give a more detailed account of how an attacker would employ DPA to attack an implementation of a cryptographic algorithm.
DPA methodology
In general, DPA can be described as a sequence of five steps [27] . It is assumed that the attacker is in possession of a device, termed the 'target' device, that is configured with an implementation of a cryptographic algorithm and a secret key. The target device could be a smart card, microprocessor, ASIC, or reconfigurable device such as an FPGA. The aim of the attack is to recover the secret key, or some portion of the secret key. It is common in DPA attacks to assume that the attacker also has access to the following information: -All messages sent and to and from the target device. Furthermore, the attacker can choose which messages to send to the device. -Knowledge of the cryptographic algorithm implemented on the device, possibly including information about the circuit design. -Recordings of the power consumption measurements of the device as various messages are processed.
Equipped with this knowledge, the DPA attack on the implementation proceeds as follows:
Select an intermediate variable to attack
The DPA attacker begins by examining the details of the cryptographic algorithm that is being executed on the device. It is assumed that the details of the algorithm are public, such that the security of the algorithm relies solely on the secrecy of the key, as per Kerckhoff's Principle [30] . Therefore, the attacker can select an intermediate variable in the algorithm upon which to focus a DPA attack. For the attack to be successful, the chosen intermediate variable must obey a 'fundamental hypothesis' [8] , which states that knowledge of a few key bits allows the attacker to determine whether two inputs to the algorithm (or two outputs) give the same value for the intermediate variable or not. In other words, the selected intermediate variable f (m, k) should be at a location in the algorithm where fixed unknown data k (i.e. a portion of the key) are combined with variable known data m (such as the inputs or outputs of the algorithm).
Calculate hypotheses for the chosen intermediate variable
The attacker then typically chooses a set of messages which will be sent to the target device. There is no theoretical limit to the size of this message set; however, practical limits may be imposed by the cryptosystem implemented on the device.
For example, the attacker may be limited to the number of cryptographic operations that can be executed using the same key. For each message m in this set, the attacker calculates the value of the chosen intermediate variable f (m, k), for each possible key portion k.
Map the hypotheses to power consumption values
The next step for the attacker is to model the power that each hypothesis for f (m, k) would consume, if it was to appear as an intermediate variable during the operation of the device. To do this, the attacker must choose a 'leakage model' for the target device. The leakage model links the data being processed by the device to the side-channel information simultaneously being monitored. In CMOS devices, the power consumption is predominantly dynamic, i.e. most of the power is dissipated when bits change from 1 → 0 or from 0 → 1. Therefore, the Hamming distance model is typically appropriate in attacks on CMOS devices [27] .
Measure the power consumption
The attacker proceeds to use the cryptographic device to process each of the messages in the chosen message set. As each message is being processed by the cryptographic algorithm, the attacker monitors and records the side-channel information that is leaked via the power consumption. In general, this involves some minor modification to the power circuitry supplying the device. A high-precision oscilloscope can be used to capture and record the side-channel information. If possible, the scope is usually adjusted such that the region of the waveform displayed corresponds only to the points in time where the chosen intermediate variable f (m, k) is being processed. The captured waveform is termed a 'power trace'.
Statistical analysis
Statistical analysis is used to compare the hypotheses with the power consumption measurements, to determine which hypothesis for the key portion was correct. Classical DPA, as described in [26] , partitions the traces and uses a differenceof-means approach for this comparison. However, the most common approach is to use Pearson's correlation coefficient, giving rise to the term correlation power analysis (CPA) [5] . When the set of hypotheses corresponding to the correct key portion is processed, the result from the correlation calculation should be significantly greater than for the other hypotheses. In this way, the correct key portion can be identified, and the attack is deemed successful.
DPA countermeasures
In the course of the last decade, resisting DPA attacks has proven to be a formidable challenge for designers of cryptographic hardware and software. Cryptographers ensure that algorithms are free from mathematical weaknesses that would expose the secret key. When implementing such an algorithm, one has to ensure that the physical implementations of these algorithms do not introduce weaknesses in the form of side-channel information that could compromise the integrity of a cryptosystem. As noted in [27] , the goal of countermeasures to DPA attacks is to make the power consumption of the cryptographic device independent of the intermediate values of the cryptographic algorithm. DPA countermeasures can be classified into two categories: masking and hiding. We focus our discussion on implementing hardware countermeasures.
Masking countermeasures
Masking countermeasures work by rendering the intermediate variables processed within the device independent of the intermediate variables in the cryptographic algorithm. This independence is achieved by combining each intermediate variable in the cryptographic algorithm with a random value (a 'mask'), which changes on each execution of the algorithm. For example, an intermediate variable x can be masked with a random value r via: x r = x ⊕ r (this is termed Boolean masking, since the masking operation is Boolean XOR, denoted ⊕). Subsequently, the masked values x r and r are manipulated at different points in time during the execution of the algorithm, rather than x. Since x r and r cannot be predicted by an attacker, first-order DPA attacks are prevented. We define the order of an attack to be the number of points that are combined within a trace, i.e. in the example above, a second-order attack would seek to combine the points where r and x r are manipulated. Such higher-order attacks are beyond the scope of this paper.
An alternative to Boolean masking is the use of an affine mask where each intermediate state is masked with two random values [43] . As above, an intermediate variable x can be masked with random values r 1 and r 2 via: x r = r 1 x ⊕ r 2 , and since x r is unpredictable to the attacker, first-order DPA attacks are prevented. This is not suitable for many algorithms since one needs to be able to compute a multiplication efficiently. However, it has been shown to be suitable for algorithms such as AES [32] where group multiplications can be defined in a straightforward manner [15] .
Masking can be applied at the architecture level, where random masks are incorporated into high-level functions, such as multiplication or key addition. Masking can also be implemented at the gate level, where basic cells such as AND and OR gates are modified to incorporate random inputs as well as masked inputs [19] . Secure implementations of cryptographic algorithms, which use these protected cells as building blocks, can subsequently be generated. If masking is applied at either the architecture or the gate level, the implementation should also include mask correction circuitry. This circuitry tracks the modifications to the mask that happen when the masked data are processed by the cryptographic algorithm, so that the mask can be removed at the end of the cryptographic computation. Such mask correction circuitry typically leads to an increase in the implementation area.
Hiding countermeasures
Hiding countermeasures work by removing the dependence of a cryptographic device's power consumption on the intermediate variables processed within the device. Therefore, hiding countermeasures either attempt to randomize the power consumption or to make it constant, so that no information about the intermediate variables is leaked in a power trace. At the architecture level, hiding can be achieved in reconfigurable devices by randomly inserting dummy operations and clock cycles, randomly changing the order of operations, or randomly changing the clock signal. Another approach is to generate noise on the device, in parallel with the execution of the cryptographic algorithm. At the gate level, hiding countermeasures takes the form of secure logic styles. Such logic styles undertake to maintain the same power consumption for every operation performed.
All-or-Nothing Transforms

Background
All-or-Nothing Transforms (AONTs) were proposed by Rivest [39] in 1997, for the purpose of deterring exhaustive ('brute force') key searches on block ciphers. An All-orNothing Transform uses a random string r to map a plaintext message m (of variable length) to a pseudo-message m . The pseudo-message is subsequently encrypted with an encryption function E and key k; for example, using a symmetric block cipher such as AES [32] .
All-or-Nothing decryption allows the receiver to recover the message m from the transmitted ciphertext c . The receiver applies the decryption function D with key k to recover m . Subsequently, the inverse AONT is applied, to recover r and m. The All-or-Nothing encryption and decryption protocols are illustrated in Fig. 1 .
The resulting cryptosystem has the property that a brute force attacker must decrypt all of the ciphertext blocks when testing each key. Hence, the average execution time of a brute force attack on an AONE mode is increased in proportion to the number of blocks in the ciphertext. In Sects. 4 and 5 of this paper, we propose the use of All-or-Nothing Encryption to protect against DPA attacks. The focus of the discussion is on block cipher-based symmetric-key cryptosystems. However, we note that the technique can also be applied to protect asymmetric encryption schemes against DPA.
An equivalent construction exists for asymmetric ciphers, where this process blinds a message such that an attacker cannot manipulate messages, for example Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [2, 4] .
Properties
As put forward in [39] , AONTs should possess four properties:
1. The transform should be invertible. Given the entire pseudo-message, one can invert the transform to retrieve the plaintext. 2. Both the AONT and its inverse should be efficiently computable. 3. All AONTs should be randomized, in order to avoid chosen-message and known-message attacks on the encryption mode. 4. If any l (or more) bits of the pseudo-message are unknown, it should be computationally infeasible to invert the AONT, or determine any function of the plaintext bits. We call this the 'All-or-Nothing' property. The value of l is AONT-dependent, but is large enough to deter brute force attacks on the pseudo-message.
Property 3 implies that pseudo-message m is not created from m using a deterministic function and will also require some random input. It is this probabilistic aspect of All-orNothing Encryption that provides protection against differential side-channel attacks. This is discussed further in Sect. 4.
Applications and constructions
As mentioned above, AONTs were originally introduced to hinder brute force key searches in cryptosystems with short key lengths, such as the 56-bit DES. Of course, modern ciphers use longer keys (AES [32] has keys with bit lengths ≥128), which make this original application of AONTs redundant for now. Indeed, it is believed that 128-bit symmetric keys will be secure until after 2030 [12] . However, AONTs have since found other useful applications in cryptography.
All-or-Nothing Transforms (AONTs) can be used to build 'chaffing and winnowing' [1] and gap secret sharing [39] schemes. Dodis [10] examined the role of AONTs in 'exposure-resilient cryptography', i.e. protecting implementations of cryptographic algorithms against partial key exposure. We note that this idea is relevant to the presentday problem of secure key storage in cryptographic devices that are vulnerable to physical attacks. However, a discussion of this topic in relation to our work is beyond the scope of this paper.
All-or-Nothing Transforms (AONTs) are also an important part of remotely keyed encryption [3, 4] and efficient encryption [23] protocols. We will consider how to use the efficient encryption application in conjunction with our new scheme in Sect. 5.
Many candidate AONT constructions have been proposed in the literature. In this paper, we focus on OAEP [2, 4] and the CTR Transform [9] as case studies. Other proposed transforms include: Package Transform [39] , Exposure-Resilient Function-based Transforms [11] , Quasigroup-based AONTs [29] , 'Extended-Indistinguishable' AONTs [44] , and ErrorCorrecting Code-based AONTs [6] .
A general AONT model
We now define a general model for AONTs, which we will draw on in Sect. 5.2. Prior to defining the model, we first examine two common AONTs, OAEP [2] , and the CTR Transform (CTRT) [9] (Fig. 2) .
The operations used by OAEP are recalled in Fig. 3 , where s||t denotes concatenation of the strings s and t, and ⊕ denotes Boolean XOR. Functions G and H are random ora- cles [2, 4] . OAEP forms the basis of a routine called Encoding Method for Encryption #1 (EME1), which is standardized in [22] . 1 According to the standard, functions G and H should be instantiated using a mask generation function called MGF1, the length of whose output is user-specified. MGF1 is based on repeated iterations of a secure one-way hash function, such as SHA-256 [33] . H produces a mask whose length is shorter than its input, whilst G expands its input.
The CTRT is illustrated in Fig. 2 . Whilst constructions of OAEP are based on hash functions, CTRT is built for symmetric-key cryptosystems using a block cipher E, such as AES. Both OAEP and CTRT conform to a general model for AONTs, shown in Fig. 4 .
In our general AONT model, an expansion function G uses the random input r to produce an 'All-or-Nothing keystream', the same length as the message m. Since r changes for each new message m, the AON keystream G(r ) can be viewed as a type of one-time pad [30] . In OAEP, the expansion function is realized using MGF1, which makes repeated calls to a hash function such as SHA-256. For CTRT, the expansion function is instantiated using a block cipher in CTR mode, essentially turning the block cipher into a stream cipher. Subsequently, this AON keystream is used to mask the message m. In both OAEP and CTRT, the masking function is simply Boolean XOR. In this way, the majority of the pseudo-message bits are generated. We call this sequence of operations a 'partial AONT'. However, the partial AONT does not possess the All-orNothing property, nor is it invertible. To achieve, the sender needs to include r in the message. This is achieved by hashing the output of the partial AONT and using it to mask the random value r . In OAEP, a cryptographic hash function is used for this purpose; in CTRT, the pseudo-message blocks are simply XOR-ed together. This final step completes the AONT, ensuring that the entire pseudo-message is required by the receiver, in order to retrieve r and invert the transform.
DPA resistance of AONE systems
Fundamental concept
As discussed in Sect. 2, all differential side-channel attacks include a hypothesis phase, where the attacker predicts all the possible values of some intermediate word(s) inside the encryption or decryption device. This can be applied to both symmetric and asymmetric ciphers, but in the following, we shall concentrate on symmetric ciphers.
The predicted hypotheses are based on knowledge of some data (usually the plaintext m), and a guess of a small portion (e.g. 8 bits) of the secret key k. In the analysis phase of the attack, the acquired traces are used to validate the correct hypothesis for the intermediate word(s) and reveal k.
In All-or-Nothing encryption, however, the plaintext m is pre-processed along with a random string r . It is the resulting pseudo-message m that is operated upon by the encryption algorithm E and key k. As illustrated in Fig. 5 , the attacker no longer knows the data m that is input to the encryption algorithm, because the AONT is probabilistic. The random input r changes on each application of the AONT, mapping m to a different m each time. Therefore, the hypothesis phase of the attack cannot be performed.
An attacker may try to compute all possible pseudomessages m that could result from transforming a known plaintext m and then continue with her hypothesis phase. Such a strategy can be rendered impractical by using a random value in the AONT with a large enough bit length, e.g. ≥128 bits. For short messages, e.g. <128 bits, it is necessary to pad m with zeros, so that the length of the pseudo-message is 128 bits, and the pseudo-message remains unpredictable to an attacker. We note that All-or-Nothing encryption inhibits the attacker's ability to form hypotheses based on the plaintext messages being processed, but does not prevent hypotheses based on the resultant ciphertexts. For example, consider the case where the encryption is performed using an iterated block cipher such as DES [31] or AES [32] . Application of the AONT protects the first rounds, but not the last rounds. Based on the known ciphertext c , the attacker can focus on the last round, work backwards, and use DPA to recover successive round keys. This type of attack is sometimes termed 'reverse DPA' [34] . To prevent reverse DPA on an All-orNothing encryption system, a suitable countermeasure could be introduced to prevent an attack based on knowledge of the ciphertexts, such as masking the last two or three encryption rounds [7] .
On the receiver side, All-or-Nothing decryption provides similar DPA resistance. Here, the presence of the inverse AONT ensures that an attacker cannot form hypotheses based on the plaintexts output from the decryption device. Of course, an attacker can still form hypotheses based on the ciphertexts input to the decryption device. Therefore, as above, it is necessary to supplement All-or-Nothing decryption with some other countermeasure, such as masking of the first two or three decryption rounds. In Sect. 5, we extend the traditional All-or-Nothing encryption and decryption modes, and develop a system that is fully resistant to DPA attacks, without the need for masking that is specific to the encryption function.
Further considerations
Clearly, the security of the source of randomness used by the AONT is important. If the source was compromised (by a side-channel attack or by other means), then an attacker could easily calculate the pseudo-messages and form her hypotheses, as in a normal DPA attack. A cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator should be a component of most pieces of cryptographic hardware [14] . Therefore, we do not regard the source of randomness as a weak link in the AONE scheme.
It is important to note that the DPA resistance of an AONE scheme depends on the encryption mode being used. The discussion above assumes that an encryption mode is in use whereby the plaintext is operated upon directly by the encryption function, such as electronic codebook (ECB) mode or cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode [30] . However, modes such as output feedback (OFB) mode or counter (CTR) mode do not process the plaintext directly; instead, the plaintext is combined with a keystream using an XOR operation. For DPA attacks on such modes of encryption, the plaintext is not used to make hypotheses about intermediate variables in Fig. 6 Extended All-or-Nothing Encryption protocol the encryption function. We will consider how such encryption modes can be protected against DPA in Sect. 5.3.
Fully DPA-resistant All-or-Nothing Encryption
Masking circuitry is specific to the encryption algorithm and is potentially costly in terms of the area used in a hardware implementation of symmetric ciphers. Therefore, a DPAresistant scheme requiring no masking is desirable. In this section, we propose an extension to the traditional All-orNothing encryption/decryption modes, with the aim of developing a fully DPA-resistant system.
Required properties
All-or-Nothing encryption renders the first rounds of an encryption scheme DPA-resistant, because of the unpredictability of the pseudo-message m . We require an extension to the protocol that provides similar DPA resistance for the last rounds of the encryption scheme. This suggests that we apply a post-encryption transform (PET) to c , the output of the encryption stage. This transform can be reversed on the decryption side by applying the corresponding predecryption transform (PDT). The PET would render c unpredictable to an attacker, even with knowledge of the transmitted ciphertext c . In addition to the encryption function output c , we allow the PET to accept another input k s , which will be defined later. We call this scheme 'Extended All-orNothing Encryption', and it is illustrated in Fig. 6 . Again, we note that our focus is on protecting encryption modes where the plaintext is directly processed by the encryption function; other encryption modes will be considered later in Sect. 5.3.
Below, we discuss the properties required by the PET, in order to construct such an Extended All-or-Nothing protocol. We confine our discussion to the construction of PETs, as the construction of the corresponding PDT is determined once a PET is chosen. If the PET can be reversed by the legitimate receiver, then it may also be reversed by an attacker. Therefore, in order for a PET to be invertible by the legitimate receiver and not by an attacker, it should include some element k s known exclusively to the sender and receiver. For example, k s could be equal to or derived from the shared secret key k. This property applies to any PET and not only to transforms based on AONTs. Given Property 1, a natural construction might be to use an expansion function G on the shared secret k s , such that G(k s ) was the same length as c . Then, the PET could use Boolean XOR to mask the ciphertext:
An eavesdropper cannot remove G(k s ) and recover c , since k s is known only to the sender and the receiver. However, G(k s ) is also an unknown constant. For block ciphers such as AES, the last stage of the encryption is an XOR with the final round key k f , which is also fixed and unknown. If the above scheme was used in conjunction with AES, an attacker could mount a reverse DPA attack on the final encryption round, combining k f and G(k s ), and making hypotheses about the value of (k f ⊕ G(k s )). Therefore, PETs should avoid constructions that combine c with a constant value, since this can be overcome by an attacker.
Property 3 A post-encryption transform, which prevents DPA hypotheses based on the ciphertext, should itself be DPA-resistant.
This final property may seem obvious; however, it is important to emphasise. When constructing PETs, it may seem reasonable to combine the shared secret k s (required by Property 1) with some variable data d. However, if these data are known to an attacker, then the focus of the DPA attack shifts from the encryption operation to the PET. Since k s is fixed and unknown, and d is variable and known, the secret parameter k s can be recovered via a DPA attack. Knowledge of k s allows an attacker to remove the PET and apply reverse DPA on c , the exposed output of the encryption function. Therefore, care should be taken in the construction of PETs to ensure that the transforms themselves are DPA-resistant.
Proposed solution
We have designed a post-encryption transform, which possesses all of the required properties. The PET construction Using a partial AONT as the PET, a new All-or-Nothing encryption protocol was constructed, providing DPA resistance to the encryption function. A block diagram of the protocol is shown in Fig. 7 . The steps of the protocol are as follows:
Encryption protocol
1. At the beginning of the communications session, the sender and receiver must agree on a secret key k and a secret initial random value r 0 . This part of the protocol is discussed below in Sect. 5.2.1. 2. The message m to be transmitted is divided into packets m j , 1 ≤ j ≤ N . The size of the packets depends on the particular transmission protocol in use by the communications system. 3. The value of j is set to 1. 4. Packet m j is transformed using an AONT with random value r j , producing a pseudo-message packet m j . 5. The pseudo-message packet m j is encrypted with the encryption algorithm E and secret key k. If E is a block cipher, then it may be applied several times, as the length of m j may exceed the block size of the cipher. If a block cipher is applied more than once, we assume that ECB or CBC mode is applied. The result is an encrypted pseudomessage packet c j . 6. A partial AONT is then applied to c j . However, a new random value is not used; instead, the random value r j−1 is reused. Clearly, it is advantageous to base the partial AONT on the same AONT that is used in the preencryption transform. In this way (for 2 ≤ j ≤ N ), the sender does not need to fully re-compute G(r j−1 ), the All-or-Nothing keystream that was generated by using the expansion function on r j−1 , because it was already computed whilst m j−1 was being generated. An extra block of G(r j−1 ) does need to be generated, however, since the bit length of m is greater than that of m. 7. The output of this post-encryption transform is ciphertext packet c j , which is transmitted to the receiver. The value of j is incremented. 8. Steps 4-7 are repeated, until all N blocks in the message have been processed.
At the receiver side, the steps of the corresponding decryption protocol are as follows:
Decryption protocol 1. The secret key k and secret initial random value r 0 are agreed upon with the sender at the start of the communications session. 2. The value of j is set to 1. 3. Packet c j is received and is processed using the (inverse) partial AONT with random value r j−1 , to produce c j . 4. Packet c j is decrypted using secret key k and D, the decryption algorithm corresponding to E. Depending on the size of c j , several calls to D may be required. The result of the decryption stage is packet m j . 5. Once all of the bits of m j have been determined, the inverse AONT is applied to it, generating m j and r j . The value of j is incremented. We note that any errors in generating m j will mean that m j cannot be determined. That is, if we consider ECB mode, one looses the independence of enciphered blocks since an error in one instance of the block cipher will affect the entire message m j . 6. Steps 3-5 are repeated, until all N packets of the received message have been processed. Finally, the m j blocks are reassembled to form the message m.
Establishing the initial random value r 0
It is important that the initial random value r 0 is not made public; otherwise, a DPA attacker could use c 1 to retrieve c 1 .
By continually resetting the target device, the attacker could gather many different values of c 1 and use this knowledge and the corresponding power traces to mount a reverse DPA attack on the encryption algorithm. In public-key cryptosystems, the initial random value can be determined as part of the normal key setup phase, for example using the Diffie-Hellman protocol [30] . However, ubiquitous cryptographic devices such as smart cards are often not part of a public-key infrastructure. Instead, these devices are often configured with secret keys at the time of their manufacture. The secret key value can only be accessed by the device itself, and by trusted entities such as banks. In this type of symmetric-key scenario, it is difficult to exchange an initial random value r 0 securely.
One could imagine a naïve solution as depicted in Fig. 8 . The sender chooses r 0 at random and essentially encrypts it by XOR-ing with k, giving r 0 . To prevent a straightforward DPA attack to recover k based on r 0 , the sender uses random values r a and r b to mask the calculation. The value of r 0 is transmitted to the receiver, who uses k to retrieve r 0 , and a random mask r c to prevent the obvious DPA attack.
However, given that r 0 = r 0 ⊕ k can be observed by an attacker and r 0 is manipulated by the receiver, this is not secure. An attacker could use r 0 as the input to a DPA attack where k is the unknown and r 0 is used to validate hypotheses. Hence, we assert that re-initializing r 0 is not a trivial problem and leave it as an open problem.
Indirect encryption modes
The protocols described in Sect. 5.2 above provide the encryption function with DPA resistance. Neither the input m nor the output c of the encryption function are known by the attacker; therefore, the hypothesis phase of the DPA attack is infeasible. This property holds for encryption modes where the pseudo-message m is operated upon directly by the encryption function, such as ECB mode or CBC mode. For encryption modes where m is not a direct input to the encryption function, the Extended All-or-Nothing protocol must be adjusted, so that the same level of DPA resistance is provided. For the purposes of this discussion, we term these encryption modes such as OFB and CTR as 'indirect encryption modes'. Figure 9 shows a block diagram of an All-or-Nothing encryption protocol using an indirect encryption mode. Essentially, the block cipher E is used as a stream cipher, with secret key k and public initialization vector I V . The keystream c that is generated is made up of blocks c i of size b, where 1 ≤ i ≤ N , b is the block size of the cipher, and N is the number of blocks in m . Typically, the initial input to the cipher is based on I V , and subsequent inputs are dependent on the block number i. For example, in CTR mode, the cipher input may comprise (I V ||i). For OFB mode, the cipher input is equal to I V for i = 1, and c i−1 thereafter.
The generated keystream c is XOR-ed with the pseudomessage, producing the ciphertext c . The natural focus for a DPA attack on such a protocol would be at the input to the encryption function E, since the initialization vector I V is a known variable. It is interesting to note that a reverse DPA attack on this protocol is not possible. Even though an attacker has access to the transmitted ciphertext c , the output of the encryption function c is obscured by the XOR with pseudo-message m . Therefore, the presence of the AONT thwarts reverse DPA attacks on indirect encryption modes. Conversely, it was observed in Sect. 4 that the presence of an AONT thwarts regular ('forward') DPA attacks on direct encryption modes.
We can note that the strategy would not change if the initialization vector I V is not known, since one can derive I V XOR-ed with the first subkey and then the second subkey to derive the secret key used. That is, one considers that the XOR with I V and the first subkey as one operation.
In order to protect the scheme against DPA, the input to the encryption function must be rendered unpredictable to an attacker. This could be achieved by using a pre-encryption transform. As in the case of the post-encryption transform in Sect. 5.2, we could make use of a partial AONT. By processing the I V for packet j with a partial AONT using the random value r j−1 , the input to the encryption function becomes unpredictable to the attacker, as illustrated in Fig. 10a . In fact, since the output of the partial AONT is simply used as a seed to produce the keystream c , the I V is not required. Therefore, the I V input to the encryption function can simply be replaced by r j−1 , to make the input to the encryption function unpredictable to an attacker. This Extended AONE protocol is shown in Fig. 10b for OFB mode encryption. In the case of CTR mode, the input to the encryption function is simply changed from (I V ||i) to (r j−1 ||i). The initial secret random value r 0 can be established as discussed in Sect. 5.2.1.
Related work
In Sects. 5.2 and 5.3, we describe how All-or-Nothing encryption schemes can be augmented to bring DPA resistance to implementations of the encryption and decryption operations. This can be regarded as a DPA countermeasure at the protocol level for block ciphers. Below, we compare this new solution with previous related work.
Relation to Masking All-or-Nothing encryption can be viewed as a type of masking countermeasure at the algorithm level. For each message packet m j to be encrypted, the AONT uses a new random 'mask' r j . The AONT expands the randomness in r j and uses it to mask all of the bits of the message m j . Therefore, the masked message m j is unpredictable to a DPA attacker. Similarly, the output of the encryption operation c j is unpredictable to an attacker, since it is concealed using r j−1 .
This DPA countermeasure differs from previously proposed masking schemes in the literature, because mask correction is not applied. Mask correction ensures that a ciphertext c that is transmitted is the same string that would have been generated by encrypting the message using an unprotected implementation of the encryption algorithm. On the other hand, in Extended All-or-Nothing Encryption, the ciphertext c that is transmitted is not the same string that would have been generated by an unprotected implementation of the encryption algorithm. In a sense, the 'mask correction' required to retrieve the message m is applied at the receiver side by the decryption protocol, when the inverse AONT is calculated.
Work of Giraud and Prouff
In [18] , Giraud and Prouff proposed a general countermeasure to counteract DPA attacks on block ciphers. Their solution was to add a layer P 0 k before the encryption operation and a layer P 1 k after, parameterized by a shared secret key k . Each layer consisted of a fixed, linear, involutive diffusion function L and a non-linear permutation π k .
Clearly, this structure is similar to that of the Extended Allor-Nothing Encryption algorithm proposed in Sect. 5.2. The main similarity lies in the fact that the encryption operation is unmodified, and transforms are applied before and after the encryption function in order to achieve DPA resistance. Furthermore, the pre-and post-encryption transforms depend on a shared secret.
However, the proposed countermeasure of Giraud and Prouff was withdrawn, after weaknesses were discovered in the design. Specifically, the output of the P 0 k layer (i.e. the input to the encryption function) was found to be predictable by an attacker, for inputs of low Hamming weight. This weakness is not present in the Extended All-or-Nothing Encryption protocol. The AONT input m is combined with the pseudo-random sequence G(r ) before being operated upon by the encryption function. Even if m is of low Hamming weight, the pseudo-randomness of the pseudo-message is unaffected; therefore, m remains unpredictable. As noted in Sect. 4, the random value r used by the AONT is long enough such that predicting r (in an effort to predict m ) is not feasible for an attacker.
Work of Tiri et al.
In [42] , Tiri, Schaumont, and Verbauwhede proposed two 'side-channel leakage tolerant architectures'. Their aim was to design cryptosystems that would burden the hypothesis phase of a DPA attack, but leave the encryption and decryption operations unmodified. The first general architecture proposed the application of permutations P 1 and P 2 before and after encryption, respectively. These permutations are dependent on secret permutation keys K p1 and K p2 . This defence against DPA attacks is similar to that accomplished by the Extended Allor-Nothing Encryption algorithm. In fact, Extended All-orNothing Encryption can be regarded as a particular type of side-channel leakage tolerant architecture. However, Tiri et al. do not provide specific constructions of the permutations P 1 and P 2 . Furthermore, they do not discuss how to distribute the secret permutation keys K p1 and K p2 , nor how often these keys should be updated. In this work, we instantiate P 1 and P 2 using AONTs and partial AONTs. The random inputs r j and r j−1 correspond to the keys K p1 and K p2 . Since a fresh value of r j is used for each message packet, this corresponds to updating the keys K p1 and K p2 for each packet.
The second architecture considered in [42] uses two intertwined CBC mode encryptions to prevent forward and reverse DPA. It is noted that the session keys must be updated regularly, to avoid the type of 'reset' attack described in Sect. 5.2.1.
In our Extended AONE algorithm, the 'session keys' correspond to the values of r j , which update for each new message packet that is encrypted. Subsequent session keys (for subsequent packets) do not need to be explicitly relayed to the receiver. However, the problem of how to prevent 'reset' attacks remains.
Because the pre-and post-encryption transforms are based on All-or-Nothing Transforms, the receiver uncovers the value of r j whilst decoding packet m j . Therefore, updates of the 'session keys' happen as a by-product of the usage of AONTs.
Other related work The concept of supplementing a cipher with a 'preliminary transform' as a power analysis countermeasure was briefly mentioned in [41] . The authors suggested that such a transform should provide high diffusion, making the values input to the cipher unpredictable. Allor-Nothing Transforms are clearly suitable in this respect, provided the value of the random input r changes for each message packet that is encrypted.
Chari et al. [7] discuss the concept of a 'general countermeasure' to power analysis attacks. Such countermeasures are as follows:
ensure that the adversary cannot predict any relevant bit in any cycle, without making run-specific assumptions independent of the actual inputs to the computation. This makes statistical tests involving several experiments impossible, since the chance of the adversary making the correct assumptions for each run is extremely low.
In the case of Extended All-or-Nothing Encryption, the 'runspecific assumption' that the adversary would need to make is to guess the random value r used by the AONT. As stated in Sect. 4, 128 is a large enough number of random bits to prohibit such guessing. Therefore, Extended All-or-Nothing Encryption can be seen as a 'general countermeasure', using the terminology defined by Chari et al. [7] .
Combining with efficient encryption
In this section, we describe how Extended All-or-Nothing Encryption can be used as a DPA countermeasure. It is worth noting that the performance of the Extended All-or-Nothing Encryption scheme can be enhanced by combining it with another application of AONTs, namely 'efficient encryption' [23, 24] .
In the 'efficient encryption' scheme, an AONT is applied to a plaintext message, but only some (as opposed to all) of the pseudo-message blocks are subsequently encrypted. The AONT mixes the plaintext in such a way that all of the pseudo-message blocks are required in order to invert the transform and regain the plaintext. Therefore, fewer secret key encryptions and decryptions are required. The transmitted ciphertext comprises both encrypted and unencrypted pseudo-message blocks.
To combine the efficient encryption with the Extended AONE scheme, the plaintext message m is transformed with an AONT, as before. A certain set of pseudo-message blocks is chosen to be encrypted with encryption function E and secret key k; knowledge of which blocks are in the set can be made public. The presence of the AONT as a pre-encryption transform prevents DPA attacks on the encryption function based on known plaintext messages. A PET (in the form of a partial AONT) must be subsequently applied to those blocks that were encrypted, to prevent reverse DPA. The transmitted ciphertext consists of pseudo-message blocks that are unencrypted, alongside blocks that are output from the PET. An Fig. 11 Extended All-or-Nothing Encryption combined with Efficient Encryption example of the combined scheme is shown in the block diagram in Fig. 11 . The system has the advantage of being resistant to DPA, whilst requiring fewer encryption operations to be performed with the secret key. Therefore, depending on the particular constructions used for the AONT and PET, and the message size, the overall latency and power consumption of the cryptosystem may be reduced.
Constructions
In this section, we suggest some constructions for the Extended All-or-Nothing Encryption scheme presented in Sect. 5. In each case, we suggest that the partial AONT used in the post-encryption transform should be based on the AONT that was used before the encryption function. In this way, most of the pseudo-random bits of the All-or-Nothing keystream required by the PET will have been generated previously.
OAEP-based
The first construction is based on the OAEP All-or-Nothing transform (as described in Sect. 3.4). The random input r j is passed to the mask generation function MGF1 [22] . The output of MGF1 is subsequently used to mask the message m j . There are several advantages to using OAEP as the AONT. Firstly, it is based on a hash function, such as SHA-256. An implementation of this hash function could be reused, for example in a key update procedure, allowing code/hardware to be reused. Secondly, hardware implementations of hash functions can achieve high throughputs, meaning that the AONT can be computed efficiently. Finally, OAEP is well studied in its other role as a standardized padding scheme for RSA [22] , and therefore, our AONT has the potential for reuse in this public-key setting.
Block cipher-based
A second construction might be based on the CTRT transform (as described in Sect. 3.4) . Here, the random input r j becomes the key of a block cipher E, which is used to encrypt a public counter, generating the required All-or-Nothing keystream. This keystream is subsequently used to mask the message packet m j . This AONT would be beneficial in devices with constrained area resources, because the same block cipher used for encryption could also be used by the AONT and PET. On the other hand, this scheme may not be suitable if the block cipher has a long key setup time, as the key r j changes for each new packet m j . A trade-off exists with the length of the message packet m j , the key setup time, and the frequency with which r j is updated.
However, since r j is fixed for the duration that packet j is being processed and the counter is public, a DPA attack could theoretically be mounted on E to recover r j . One workaround would be to limit the size of the packet m j so that only a small number of blocks (less than the number required to mount a DPA attack) would be encrypted using r j .
A better solution would be to modify the AONT construction, whilst adhering to the general model in Fig. 4 . Rather than use the block cipher E in counter (CTR) mode to generate the AON keystream, we suggest using some other encryption mode, where each block encrypted by E depends on the previous block, such as CBC, CFB, or OFB [30] . Since the key r j is unknown, the input and output blocks of E are also unknown to a DPA attacker, precluding a DPA attack on the AONT. The last pseudo-message block would be generated by hashing r j together with the other pseudo-message blocks (e.g. using XOR, as in the case of CTRT), thereby completing the AONT. The corresponding AONTs could be termed CBCT, CFBT, or OFBT respectively, depending on the encryption mode upon which each is based.
Stream cipher-based
Since the block cipher-based constructions above are effectively using the block cipher as a synchronous stream cipher, an AONT could also be constructed using a dedicated stream cipher. In the general model of Sect. 3.4, the stream cipher would take the place of the AONT's expansion function G. The stream cipher would use r j as the key and produce the All-or-Nothing keystream by encrypting some public initialization vector. Care needs to be taken that the stream cipher is not susceptible to DPA. The AON keystream generated by the stream cipher can subsequently be used to mask the message packet m j . As above, the AONT would be completed by hashing r j together with the masked message, e.g. using XOR, thereby generating the last pseudo-message block.
It may be undesirable to include hardware for both a stream cipher and the actual encryption algorithm E in the same implementation, because of area constraints. However, stream ciphers have recently been designed specifically to work well in restricted area environments [13] . Many of the stream ciphers described in [13] have advantages over block ciphers such as AES. Therefore, it may well be possible to build fast, area efficient AONTs based on stream ciphers. Another solution would be to reuse the same stream cipher that was used to build the AONT, to realise the encryption algorithm E.
Alternative transforms
It is possible to derive an alternative set of transforms for use as a DPA countermeasure. These transforms are also based on the general AONT model of Sect. 3.4, but the All-orNothing property is omitted. For example, an alternative preencryption transform (derived from OAEP) may consist of MGF1 applied to a shared random value r α , followed by an XOR with the message m. The step where r α is hashed along with the pseudo-message is omitted. Therefore, no 'key updates' (as discussed in Sect. 5.4) can take place, and the receiver must already possess the value of r α in order to invert the transform.
The alternative post-encryption transform would possess similar characteristics, XOR-ing the output of the encryption function c with a pseudo-random sequence generated from r β , to produce the transmitted ciphertext c . The value of r β must be known only to the sender and receiver; it may be the case that r β is derived from r α . Here, the message is not considered in packets m j , because r α and r β provide the seeds for the pseudo-random keystreams that are used for all packets throughout the entire communication. This alternative set of transforms is somewhat similar to the general 'side-channel leakage tolerant architecture' presented in [42] .
Because the All-or-Nothing property is omitted from these alternative transforms, their hardware implementations may compute in slightly less time and consume fewer area resources. However, we point out the following disadvantages of using these alternative transforms instead of the Extended All-or-Nothing scheme described in Sect. 5:
-The security of the fixed values r α and r β is paramount to protecting against DPA. If these values can be determined by an attacker, then all messages packets are susceptible to DPA attacks. On the other hand, Extended All-or-Nothing encryption provides a method of securely updating the random r j values that are used in the transforms. Even if one of these random values could be determined by an attacker, it is only valid for two packets and is of limited use. -Combining these alternative transforms with the efficient encryption application, as described in Sect. 5.5, leads to security issues. Ciphertext blocks that were not encrypted by the encryption function E using secret key k would now be wholly dependent on the secrecy of r α and r β to provide security. The strong security properties that derive from the use of E would not be imparted to all of the blocks of the pseudo-message. On the other hand, in Extended All-or-Nothing encryption, the receiver requires the entire pseudo-message before the plaintext can be recovered, due to the All-or-Nothing property. Even if only some of the pseudo-message blocks are encrypted using E, the security properties of the cipher E are imparted to the entire pseudo-message, because of the All-or-Nothing relationship among the pseudo-message blocks.
Conclusion
Boolean and affine masking are among the most popular DPA countermeasures in the literature [8, 43] . If masking schemes are applied at the algorithm level, they must be designed specifically for a given encryption algorithm. This extra design effort typically provides first-order DPA security, at the cost of efficiency [36] . Masking at the gate level can be performed independently of the encryption algorithm, but such schemes also typically impact the area and speed of the cryptosystem [19] . In our analysis, we use hardware implementations as a running example, but our arguments should apply to embedded software implementations with straightforward modifications. The Extended All-or-Nothing Encryption protocol provides DPA resistance that is not specific to a particular encryption algorithm. Clearly, extra area and time are required in order to perform the pre-and post-encryption transforms. As an example, consider the OAEP transform, which is based on a hash function. Whilst a hash function cannot achieve the same throughput as a block cipher [21] , we have shown that it is not necessary to encrypt the entire AONT output, because of the All-or-Nothing property, since it is sufficient to encrypt just some of the pseudo-message blocks. Therefore, the impact of using an AONT can be minimized. However, a thorough comparison between AONTs and masking schemes is beyond the scope of this paper.
It has also been shown that even masked implementations are susceptible to higher-order DPA attacks [35] . These higher-order attacks circumvent the masking countermeasure by considering multiple samples within a power trace. These samples correspond to places in the algorithm where the same mask is used with different (but predictable) data. However, all of these higher-order attacks include a hypothesis phase based on known data. All-or-Nothing encryption removes the ability of an attacker to form hypotheses and, therefore, provides protection against higher-order attacks as well as first-order attacks.
